The visible and the invisible: Distributed Cognition for medical devices by Furniss, D et al.
The visible and the invisible: Distributed Cognition for 
medical devices 
Dominic Furniss, Ann Blandford, Atish 
Rajkomar & Chris Vincent 
UCLIC 
UCL, Gower Street 
London WC1E 6BT, UK 
+44 20 7679 0688 
a.blandford@ucl.ac.uk  
Astrid Mayer 
Department of Oncology 
Royal Free NHS Trust 
Pond Street  
London, NW3 2QG, UK 
ABSTRACT 
Many interactive medical devices are less easy to use than 
they might be, and do not fit as well as they could in their 
contexts of use. Occasionally, the deficiencies lead to 
serious incidents; more often, they have a less visible effect 
on the resilience and efficiency of healthcare systems. 
These issues remain largely invisible as they are not 
reported and have rarely been studied. In this paper, we 
report on the use of DiCoT as an approach to representing 
and reasoning about medical work, and about the role of 
device design within that work. We focus in particular on 
the design and use of infusion devices. This work highlights 
the value of observational studies for engineering 
interactive medical devices, and illustrates the value of a 
systematic approach to gathering and analyzing qualitative 
data.  
Keywords 
Distributed Cognition, medical devices, DiCoT, situated 
interaction, infusion devices. 
INTRODUCTION 
To improve the engineering of interactive medical devices, 
it is essential to understand how those devices are used in 
context, as well as considering the engineering of the 
devices in isolation (e.g. ensuring consistency, reliability 
and safety of interactions). In this paper, we focus on the 
use of infusion devices, relatively simple devices that are 
used by both clinical professionals and lay people, but 
particularly by nurses. The use of such devices is inherently 
complex: even if the devices are configured as simply as 
possible, they are used in a variety of environments, as part 
of a complex set of tools and procedures. 
One source of information about the impact of device 
design on use is to be found in incident reports, particularly 
root cause analyses, such as the reports in the MAUDE 
(Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience)
database [12]. Occasionally, incidents hit the headlines and 
provoke further discussion – e.g. the cases of Denise 
Melanson [10] and Lisa Norris [16]. However, such high 
profile incidents are mercifully rare, and many incidents are 
minor and may not be reported at all. For example, Husch 
et al. [7] suggest that few incidents are reported. In a study 
of infusion pump use in a busy hospital, covering 426 
intravenous infusions, they identified a total of 389 errors, 
occurring in 285 of the infusions. In other words, 2/3 of the 
infusions on which data was gathered involved at least one
error. Many of these errors would be classed as minor, but 
55 were either rate deviation or incorrect medication errors, 
which had the potential to be serious. For comparison, only 
48 incidents in the same categories had been reported 
through the formal reporting system over the previous two 
years from the same hospital. As discussed below, it might 
have been inappropriate to class all 389 events as “errors”, 
but this study highlights what a small proportion of errors 
are reported. 
However, error cases alone are not sufficient to engineer 
good systems: it is also necessary to have a good 
understanding of normal practice. In this paper, we present 
a study of normal practice in an oncology day care unit, 
focusing particularly on the use of infusion devices. We use 
DiCoT  (Distributed Cognition for Teamwork) [3] as a 
framework for structuring observations and to support 
reasoning about design. We illustrate modes of reasoning 
about design by discussing two design requirements that 
were identified in our studies.
DISTRIBUTED COGNITION 
Distributed Cognition has emerged as an approach to 
reasoning about system design that starts from the premise 
that the ways that people make decisions and interact are 
dependent on the external environment as well as internal 
cognitive processes: that the environment provides 
resources to support thinking [5]. Furthermore, the structure 
of the environment can be analyzed from a cognitive 
perspective; i.e. the people, roles, tasks, artifacts and the 
physical layout of the system will impact the way 
information is processed. For example, a bridge of a ship 
[8] and an aircraft cockpit [9] have been analysed in this 
way. Distributed Cognition therefore describes how socio-
technical systems are structured to process information. 
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Properties of the system that help or hinder the processing 
of information can then be identified and engineered. 
Distributed Cognition has been applied as an approach to 
understanding healthcare systems; for example, Nemeth et 
al [13] and Xiao [18] analyse the roles of artifacts in 
supporting communication within clinical teams. However, 
the focus of these studies has been on facilitating 
communication rather than supporting the situated work of 
an individual nurse, or reasoning about the design of a 
particular device. 
Distributed Cognition (DC) has traditionally involved a 
high degree of craft skill on the part of the analysts. Two 
different approaches to codifying DC have been proposed. 
Wright et al [17] present the Resources Model as a 
structured approach to reasoning about the design of an 
interactive computer system from a DC perspective, 
focusing on the resources that the system makes available to 
its user. The Resources Model approach is tailored to the 
analysis of individual human–computer interactions. In 
contrast, the Distributed Cognition for Teamwork (DiCoT) 
[3] approach focuses attention on interactions between 
multiple people and multiple artifacts, and how the design 
of technology influences those interactions. A DiCoT 
analysis involves constructing five interdependent models: 
information flow, physical, artefact, social and 
evolutionary. These models each have associated principles 
from the distributed cognition literature. The method 
provides a structured approach for engaging with socio-
technical systems. In the study reported here, we focus on 
the use of DiCoT to reason about the design of infusion 
pumps.
Furniss and Blandford [4] identify four ways in which 
DiCoT can assist in moving from analysis to design and 
engineering: 
1. To explain the basic mechanics of a system, e.g. so 
its structure and functions are understood.
2. The development of deep conceptual insight, e.g. 
we found the property of ‘buffering’ is particularly 
important to the performance of ambulance 
dispatch [3].
3. Identifying opportunities for incremental 
developments to improve the system.
4. Considering revolutionary designs where the 
system may work in a fundamentally different way.
In this paper we focus on two incremental design 
considerations from disturbances that were observed in 
practice.
BACKGROUND: INFUSION PUMPS 
Infusion pumps are important ubiquitous devices in 
hospitals. Volumetric infusion pumps are typically used to 
pump nutrients or medications from bags into patients 
intravenously. They control the rate of fluid in the line that 
connects the patient to the bag. These devices can be 
programmed at specified volumes, times and rates. The 
interface on the pump broadly consists of a number entry 
system and a display. 
Infusion pumps are commonly configured for the different 
needs of intensive treatment units, paediatrics units and 
more general wards. This study focuses on an Oncology 
Day Care Unit. The unit provides treatment to patients on a 
day basis, i.e. typically patients will come in, get treatment 
and return home on the same day. This includes the use of 
infusion pumps for intravenous treatment; e.g. 
chemotherapy treatment. 
Due to their wide use and importance it should be no 
surprise that others have studied the broader class of 
infusion pumps. Lin et al. [11] assessed a PCA (patient-
controlled analgesia) pump, identified HCI issues and 
proposed a redesign with a lower likelihood for error. 
Obradovich and Woods [15] evaluated a syringe pump that 
patients take home to use. Through interviews and 
evaluation, they found complex sequences, mode 
confusions and arbitrary alarms that needed redesigning. 
More recently, pro-formas have been proposed to 
standardise the observation of infusion pump use [1]; and 
nurses’ acceptance of infusion pump use with error-
reducing software has been studied [2]. Our study took an 
exploratory approach to investigate HCI issues with 
volumetric infusion pumps in use in the Day Care Unit 
(DCU). To our knowledge the two issues we highlight have 
not been reported elsewhere.  
METHOD 
Data for this study were gathered by conducting 
observations in the DCU. In addition, two members of staff 
in the unit were interviewed to clarify issues that had arisen 
in the observations. For the observations, extensive field 
notes were taken, structured according to the themes of DC. 
Interviews were audio recorded and transcribed. Data 
gathering lasted for 5 days. These were spread over a 
number of weeks to allow for reflection between data 
gathering days. Our primary focus was on the design and 
use of infusion pumps. A secondary focus was to 
understand the context in which they are used. Here we 
focus on how the pumps were set up and used.  
We focused on the information flow, physical and social 
models – to build an understanding of the infusion pump 
programming task and the environment in which they 
worked. We gathered data to describe the system in terms 
of the models, and used the associated principles to help 
embellish this picture. Disturbances in performance were 
noted in conjunction with direct observations and by 
interrogating the developing models. The models’ 
representations would often crystallise observations and 
raise questions that would need further data gathering. 
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Figure 1: Task steps and disturbances in infusion pump interaction 
OBSERVATION RESULTS: NORMAL WORK 
31 programmable infusion interactions were observed over 
the 5 days; not all observations were complete because key 
presses were not always visible. The nurses’ interactions 
were often very fast and without error or issue.  
We first describe the normal stages of setting up a pump, 
and then describe two of the disturbances that were 
observed. The normal stages for programming an infusion 
pump, which we observed in most cases, are as follows (see 
Figure 1):
 The pump is turned on. 
 The eject button is pressed to open the pump’s door. 
The tube that connects the bag to the patient is inserted 
and the door is closed. 
 The pump asks the user to release the roller clamp and 
press OK when they have done so. The roller clamp’s 
release allows the fluid to flow from the bag to the 
patient. 
 The pump displays zero values for the VTBI. The 
value needs to be entered by the user before pressing OK 
to confirm the value. 
 The nurse can then enter either the time or infusion 
rate. Once they have confirmed either of these values by 
pressing OK, the pump calculates the missing value; i.e., 
if the pump knows the VTBI and time it can work out the 
rate, and if the pump knows the VTBI and the rate it can 
work out the time. 
 Once all these values have been checked, the user 
presses the START button and the infusion commences. 
Over the course of the observation period, several kinds of 
disturbance to this normal flow of activities were observed. 
Here, we discuss two of them. 
VTBI (Volume To Be Infused) issue 
This issue relates to the stage in programming the infusion 
pump that needs the VTBI value. It is the first value that is 
required by the pump; it is a stage that cannot be skipped, 
and sometimes nurses do not have this value so it needs to 
be calculated manually. This is noted as disturbance 5 in 
Figure 1. 
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As well as specifying the type of medication, the 
prescription should detail the VTBI, the infusion rate and 
the time. However, in the incident that drew our attention to 
this issue, this was not the case. In this incident, the 
observer (hereafter referred to as A1) observed a nurse 
interact with the pump far more than normal. A1 overheard 
the nurse tell the patient that maths was not their strong 
point to make conversation and to allude to the difficulty 
they were having. A1 observed the nurse turn the pump on 
and off, and then program the pump with little difficulty. 
The nurse was too busy to discuss the matter at the time but 
we later found out the VTBI was not on the prescription 
chart and so they had to work it out mentally.  
The prescription instructed the nurse to set up an infusion 
with a rate of 15ml/hr over a 20 minute period. This is a 
standard calculation a nurse should be able to perform 
mentally, but the nurse reported that the calculation was just 
not working for them at that point in time. The nurse 
proceeded by entering a trial value of 10ml for VTBI to go 
through to the time and rate settings. The nurse then entered 
one of these given values and saw what the pump calculated 
for the remaining value. They could then see the calculated 
figure for the remaining value and deduce whether their 
guessed VTBI was higher or lower than that needed, and by 
what sort of margin. By performing this trial and error 
workaround, the nurse worked out the correct VTBI. The 
nurse then restarted the pump and programmed it correctly. 
Battery issue 
The second issue we discuss is marked as disturbance 6 in 
Figure 1: an infusion was manually stopped as soon as it 
was started because the device had a low battery. Typically 
all pumps are charged overnight on the Day Care Unit 
ready for the next day. Pumps are run on their rechargeable 
battery rather than being plugged in. One of the main 
reasons for this is for mobility, both in terms of staff 
moving them around the unit and the patients remaining 
mobile while receiving their treatment, e.g. so that they can 
go to the toilet. 
A1 watched a nurse at intermittent times throughout the day 
setting up successive parts of one patient’s treatment. The 
nurse explained that some treatments last all day with a 
succession of different infusion programs. S/he remarked 
that you needed to be careful toward the end of the day 
because the device’s battery charge would not last for the 
last treatment. S/he said that forgetting this was highly 
frustrating because you have to program a new pump to 
finish the infusion with unfamiliar partial values. 
Later that day, A1 was watching the nurse; s/he seemed to 
program everything correctly, pressed start, but then 
immediately paused the pump. S/he pointed to the battery 
charge indicator, which was low, and said that it would not 
last. The nurse looked for a convenient socket to plug it in, 
but then went to get a new pump that was fully charged and 
reprogrammed the infusion with this new pump.  
DISCUSSION 
We have presented an example of normal work and two 
disturbances to that work (drawn from a larger set, to 
illustrate the roles of observation and structured analysis in 
informing design). The description of normal work, which 
forms a basis for part of the DC analysis of nurses’ work in
the DCU, could, in principle, have been based on 
documentation of how to use the device, but was validated 
through observations of nurses at work. The disturbances 
that we observed are undocumented, and can only be 
identified through observation. They are not sufficiently 
disruptive to feature in incident reports, and therefore 
would not be identified if incident reports were the major 
source of information to inform new design; nevertheless, 
they are significant disturbances to normal work, and 
highlight possibilities for better engineered future designs. 
The description of normal work provides a structure for 
making sense of the disturbances. 
In this section, we consider three themes: the role of 
observation in revealing such interaction issues; the role of 
DiCoT in structuring the analysis; and possible 
interventions to improve future designs. 
Revealing invisible interaction issues 
Early discussions with the nurses indicated that there was 
little wrong with the infusion pumps: they used the pumps 
frequently, they felt that they were well designed and they 
did not have any interaction issues to report. However, 
results reported here, in response to observational work 
rather than self-report, did find interaction issues.  
We speculate that self-reporting failed because of the 
nurses’ “can-do” attitude in the face of problems; time 
pressure; lack of vocabulary to articulate these HCI issues; 
and that they do not have the interest a HCI expert has in 
these interaction issues. Interviews and questionnaires alone
are limited for revealing these problems. 
As noted above, the issues discussed here have not featured 
prominently in reported incidents that have, typically, 
resulted in serious harm. Reported battery life issues are 
more commonly associated with the poor retention of 
power, or battery failure, rather than cuing the user to 
insufficient power at the point of programming. This design 
intervention has the potential to improve device and battery 
management for nurses. Low battery power can be a 
problem when a socket is unavailable, e.g. when a patient is 
in transfer from one ward to another. In these situations the 
normally invisible interaction issue would become a 
significant problem. 
We note that clarifying the need for entering VTBI for the 
safe use of the pump has been remarkably difficult. It is 
important to do this to understand the space for 
reengineering; however, the reasons for choosing VTBI as 
the first value to be entered were not known by the clinical 
staff we had contact with, either on the day care unit or their 
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management team. In this sense, potentially important 
interaction design rationale is not known or visible. 
Due to their contextual nature, it is unlikely that these issues 
would have been discovered by analytic methods or 
laboratory studies alone. For example, it is recent advances 
in pump design that have introduced the battery issue: 
advances in technology have made infusion pumps small 
enough to be easily mobile; older, larger pumps were 
difficult to move around, and were therefore commonly 
stationary. Whilst stationary, their battery would only be 
used for back-up, and so the battery issue would not have 
been a problem. 
These two results were unremarkable disturbances in the 
nurses’ normal work which, without observation, would 
remain unreported, unnoticed and invisible. For the nurses 
we observed having the difficulties, these are merely 
frustrations that could be alleviated. For the VTBI issue one 
might need to use a bit more caution and mental effort to 
work out the VTBI manually. For the battery issue one 
might need to plug the infusion pump in to one of the many 
sockets around the unit, or programme a new pump partway 
through an infusion. 
However, we could imagine rare situations where these 
could contribute to an incident if unresolved. Indeed, the 
safety literature often refers to accidents as an unfortunate 
combination of multiple minor failures rather than having a 
single main cause [6]. For example, imagine a novice nurse, 
in an emergency, who is trying to work out the VTBI 
manually because s/he cannot skip this stage. At the same 
time another pump’s alarm disturbs her/him to signify it is
running out of battery charge: s/he forgot to check the 
battery indicator when s/he programmed it. S/he switches 
attention to changing the second pump. In trying to 
calculate the dose for the new pump s/he confuses it with 
the other VTBI calculation and enters too high an infusion 
rate; the patient comes to harm. This is only illustrative, but 
experience tells us to prepare for the unanticipated [6]. 
The role of DiCoT in the analysis 
The process diagram shown above (Figure 1) is one of 
many representations developed as part of this analysis. 
Others include representations of the device interface and 
of spatial layouts. As others (e.g. [14]) have noted, the 
details of healthcare work are messy, and it is essential to 
have an appropriate structuring representation to guide 
observations, and to organize information to support 
sensemaking. DiCoT served such a role in this study. 
Without such a structuring representation to focus data 
gathering and analysis, the task might have become 
intractable. 
Socio-technical intervention 
Ideally, we would like to make interventions to alleviate 
interaction issues. We discuss different socio-technical 
interventions in response to our results below; this work is 
on-going, so we report it as work-in-progress. An important 
concern is the lack of clarity on what is possible and what is 
current practice, making definitive recommendations 
difficult: 
Manufacturer 
In terms of the VTBI issue, the device’s instructions tell us 
that the pump has been configured so the VTBI is a ‘target 
value’. This means that it must be entered first, then either 
the time or the rate, before the machine calculates the third. 
If the second or third value is manipulated then the target 
value should remain the same whilst the corresponding third 
or second value is automatically adjusted; e.g., if the time is 
changed then the VTBI should remain the same and the rate 
should adjust accordingly. 
Discussions with health services staff have revealed that the 
device can be configured so that values can be entered in 
any order (this is the set-up in the intensive care unit). 
However, devices in the Day Care Unit have been 
configured so that the user must enter the VTBI as the 
‘target value’. An untidy workaround to enter the time and 
infusion rate so that the pump calculates the VTBI has been 
developed by technical staff, but nurses do not know this, 
and it is far from ideal. 
The battery issue is more clear-cut, in that this is a 
manufacturing design intervention, and not to do with local 
training, configuration, or management; i.e. the device 
could be designed to warn the user if the programmed 
treatment time will outlast the battery at the point of 
programming. During introductory meetings with the 
manufacturers of the observed pumps we raised this issue 
and proposed this intervention; this suggestion was well 
received.   
Local Training, Configuration and Management 
In terms of the VTBI issue, some staff assert that all 
prescriptions have the VTBI available, which contradicts 
other accounts. The nurse we observed understood that the 
VTBI value was not available to her. We speculate that 
some doctors or pharmacists might not include this in their 
handwritten prescriptions if they do not recognise the 
importance of doing so. If VTBI is always present, then 
training should focus more on where the VTBI can be 
found; otherwise, training needs more focus on how to 
quickly and reliably calculate VTBI from time and rate. 
Alternatively, management might review policies and 
procedures. For example, if not entering the VTBI first 
does not pose any risk to patient safety then the pumps 
could be configured so that any value can be entered, which 
is the set-up in the intensive care unit. Alternatively the 
policy would need to state that there is an accurate VTBI 
for every prescription. 
CONCLUSION 
In this position paper, we have discussed the roles of 
observation and analysis structured around Distributed 
Cognition in informing the engineering of medical devices 
that are better suited to their intended context of use. This 
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work is at an early stage of development; for example, it is 
essential to conduct similar studies in different wards, in 
different hospitals, and with devices from different 
manufacturers. However, this study has illustrated the value 
of DiCoT as a framework for structuring data gathering and 
analysis, and has also highlighted the importance of 
conducting observational studies of normal work, and of 
not relying on incident reports or self-report as the principal 
data sources for informing future design decisions. 
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